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Distribution conflicts and wage-price dynamics in the seventies
have stimulated macroeconomic thinking about the influence and the effects
of collective wage bargaining on economic stability. Although the macro-
economic literature has identified several core determinants of wage in-
creases through time, it has never paid much attention to the interdepen-
dence of collective wage bargaining and economic dynamics and to the bar-
gaining process itself.
Some recent research tries to overcome this black box character of
wage formation by introducing elements of the bargaining theory into exis-
ting macromodels. This paper is in line with these attempts. We integrate
the well-known Nash-solution for the puzzle of the bargaining indetermi-
nacy within the cyclical growth model of Goodwin (1967).
First of all, we start with a short characterization of the exis-
ting bargaining literature. Next, we set out the original Goodwin model
and give some arguments why this model can benefit from an extension with
bargaining elements. Then we will introduce an alternative formalisation
of the Nash-solution. This formalisation enables us to describe the bar-
gaining results of a class-compromise on distribution issues within an
accumulation model. Finally, we integrate the Nash-compromise within the
Goodwin model. Our version of the Nash-solution replaces Goodwin's assump-
tion of a real Phillips-curve. The proposed formulation of wage formation
yields as the main conclusion that the growth cycle will disappear. The
accumulation tends in the long run to a steady-state solution.
II WAGE BARGAINING: RELEVANCE AND LITERATURE
In business cycle literature and econometric simulations, it is
common to modcl level and growth rate of' wages with the Phillips-curve or
with onc oF its modlfications. 'I'o a large extent, this rather mechanica]
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assumption on wage formation can be defended on empirical grounds. The
Phillíps-curve approach however remains ultimately a theoretical interpre-
tation ad hoc. As an empirical construction, it has nothing to say about
the process and dynamics of collective wage bargaining which precede and
determine wage formatíon in unionized labour markets.
This black box character of wage formation was challenged by the
stagflation of the seventies. Wages, real as well as nominal, did not
follow the cyclical pattern as predicted by the Phillips-curve. Searching
for the causes of the distributional conflicts and the wage-price dynamics
of those years, macroeconomists were stimulated to explore the wage forma-
tion in a bargaining context and its interdependence with economic dyna-
mics. Because macro-economic theory has never paid much attention to wage
formation in unionized labour markets, recent research had to develop new
lines of inquiry. Part of the current work in this field tries to resolve
this problem by introducing elements of the bargaining theory into exis-
ting macromodels.
Economists faced the bargaining problem for the first time in
connection with duopoly theory. The existence of power on both sides of
the market and the relevance of bargaining elements precluded the applica-
tion of the standard methods for determining prices and quantities. This
indeterminacy problem was challenged in the thirties with the work of
Zeuthen (1930) and Hicks (1932) on wage bargaining, and since then a lot
of theories have been developed which provide determinate solutions. Nowa-
days, the work on bargaining forms a separate theoretical discipline.
In surveys on bargaining theory ( Coddington 1968, Roth 1979, Young
1975) it is usual to distinguish two different branches.
First there are the axiomatic approaches of game theory. These
formalisations do not describe the dynamics nor the process of bargaining,
but instead impose or derive certain reasonable axiomas which the final
outcome ought to satisfy. Key concepts are rational behaviour of the nego-
tiators and Pareto-optimality of the outcome. The axiomatic models have
been critizised for their normative charscter. The axiomas prescribe an
outcome or enable the game theorist to predict the outcome with a certain
degree of probability. But the axiomas do not have any explanatory power3
t'or the inside proc.ess of' bargtttninK. 'i'he game solution is essentia]ly no
more than a description of the agreement which rational players will reach
or a"fair" arbitrator or mediator will suggest.
The Nash-approach (1950), an early but still one of the most in-
fluential game-theoretical formalisation, is often used by economists for
solving the bargaining puzzle. Later on, we will set out the Nash-solution
and make use of it.
As a second branch the descriptive approaches can be dis-
tinguished. In contrast to game theory, these models are concerned with a
detailed description of the actual bargaining process and its actual out-
come. Well-known representatives are Zeuthen, Hicks, Pen (1950. 1952) and
Cross~Coddington (1966~1968). The models differ in the nature of the spe-
cified concession-mechanisms. Each approach stresses and models different
aspects of the bargaining dynamics. They all try to show the existence of
a so-called convergence path: a dynamic sequence of claims and concessions
resulting in a determinate agreement. Compared to game theory, these mo-
dels have the flavour of describing real bargaining problems as they make
use of imperfect information, expectation adjustments about the concealed
aims and strategies of the other party and the manner in which parties
come to concessions and treat conflict threats. However, the descriptive
models can be critizised for being rather deterministic. To get a conver-
gence path with a determinate result, just one or a few aspects of the
bargaining process are identified while the further behaviour of the par-
ties is subjected to very restrictive assumptions.
The axiomatic as well as the descriptive approaches are mostly
micro formulations which assume a fixed bargaining range. From a macroeco-
nomic point of view, this partial and static character of the bargaining
literature is highly unsatisfactory. A portrayal of collective wage bar-
gaining has to point out its interdependency with economic dynamics. By
integrating bargaining theories into existing macro models, both sides can
benefit; the macro-models specify the relevant bargaining range, while
(elements of) the bargaining theories explain process and determinants of
the wage formation.4
Struggling with the difficulty how to treat power and wage sticki-
ness in unionized labour markets, recent neoclassical theory has opted for
the introduction of a monopoly-union. This approach, the socalled Monopo-
ly-Union approsch, seaumaa that th~ union monopali~aa l~bour aupply and
fixes the wage rate at that level which maximises the expected collective
utility of all its members, and allows the profít-maximising employers to
determine the level of employment. This solution is not Pareto-optimal,
however. Both the monopoly-union and the employers can improve their poai-
tions by cooperation. The determination of the resulting wage-employment
combination under cooperation and the split up of the surplus income are
dealt with by the Efficient-Bargaining approach. Use of elements of the
bargaining theory provídes unique solutions. A fruitful and realistic
element of these two approaches is the introduced objective function of
the union. It is not a mere wage-claimer. Instead, the union bears respon-
sibility for the unemployed by trading off the utility gain from increased
wages against the utility loss of decreased employment. Unsatisfactory is
the modelling of the firms as powerless quantity-adjusters as well as the
static nature of the formalisations. In order to obtain some dynamics,
neoclassicals have to fall back on exogeneous random shocks. The current
theory is mainly initiated by McDonald 8~ Solow (1981). Oawald (1985) and
Calmfors (~985) present surveys on the literature and the several exten-
sions.
Apart from the neoclassical exercises within the general equili-
brium approach, there are just a few and rather isolated attempts which
try to describe wage bargaining within a macroeconomic setting.
Shubik (1952) and Selten 8, Giith (1982) choose the multiplier-acce-
lerator model as a reference point and use the Nash-solution for the de-
termination of income distribution. Both attempts emphasise the informa-
tion aspects of the bargaining process. Shubik stresses imperfect informa-
tion about the cylical situation as well as the power resources and firm-
ness of the opponent for exploring the conditions whether or not parties
can come to agreements. Selten 8~ GUth on the other hand use the concepts
of perfect information and maximal cooperative behaviour for deriving a5
so-called efficient wage bargaining function which for each period deter-
mines simultaneously the functional distribution and the level of national
income.
Lancaster (i9~3) and Przeworski 8~ Wallerstein (1982) attack the
notion - especially popular under Marxists - that the basically zero-sum
character of the capital-labour relation prevents any establishment of a
durable class compromise on wage increments and distribution issues. Using
game-theoretical approaches, they show that under certain conditions both
parties can be better off with class compromises than with the adoption of
militant class strategies. So cooperation and compromises on wage regula-
tion and distribution should not be considered as irrational for realizing
specific class-objectives.
Let us end this brief characterization of the literature with a
final remark. Clearly, the old and current work has revealed a lot about
the objectives and strategies of the negotiating parties and about the way
the parties interact to obtain agreements on "wage front". Despite the
recent research mentioned above, what is still missing is an adequate
approach for modelling the interdependence of collective wage bargaining
and macroeconomic dynamics. This paper has to be viewed as an attempt to
provide a contribution in this direction. As stated before we set out an
integration of the Nash solution with the cyclical-growth model of Good-
win.
III THE GOODWIN MODEL
Goodwin derives a self-sustained growth cycle from the key-assump-
tions that wage formation and distribution depend on the employment rate,
while the profit rate determines the growth rate of accumulation.
The purpose here is first to set out the Goodwin model and its
dynamics, and second to give a comment on the way wage formation is re-
flected. The exposition is in difference equations (compare Glombowski 8~
KrUger 1984j; aii variables are real and net.6
Employment L is determined by the labour productivity y and the
level of income Y:
(1) Lt - Yt~Yt
Technical progress is neutral in the sense of Harrod; so labour producti-
vity is rising at a constant rate of growth m,
(2) Ytil~yt - 1 } m
while the output-capital ratio k remains constant:
(3) k - Yt~Kt.
K denotes the capital stock.
Supply of labour N expands with a constant growth rate n:
(4) Ntt1INt - 1 ; n
Workers do not save and conaume the whole wage income. With w as the real
wage rate, actual profits P can be expressed as:
(5) Pt - Yt - wtLt
The combination of (1) and (5) gives an expression for the wage share in
income ~:
Í6) ~t - wt~Yt
The growth factor of the wage share is obtaíned by dividing the growth
factor of the real wage rate by the growth factor of labour productivity:
a
~t yttl,yt
ttl wttl,wtUsing the empirical observation that the real wage rate rises ín the
neighbourhood of full employment, Goodwin relates the growth factor of
real wages to the actual employment rate g. The latter is the ratio of
employment to labour supply:
(7) ~t - Lt~Nt
Without loss of the essence, the discrete variant keeps the elegance of
Goodwin's original formulation in differential terms if the rate of em-




Equation ( 8) can be interpreted as a linear and real approximation
of the original Phillips-curve.
Finally, the accumulation process has to be specified. The capitalists can
only make use of realized profits for the financing of investments. It is
assumed that the capitalists spend a constant fraction d of profits on
investments, ~K. The other part is consumed.
(9) oKt - dPt
With (3), (5), ( 6) and (9) the growth rate of the accumulation can be
stated as:
~K dP
(10) K t- K t- dk(1-~t)
t t
Because of the constancy of d and k, fluctuations in the accumulation rate
are wholly determined by the profit share. Note that the model excludes
realization problems: production always equals income and demand.
(1)-(10) determinP a cyclical growth process around the steady-state
growth rate ntm, where fluctuations in the accumulation rate arise from
the interaction of the wage share and the employment rate. The model can
be reduced to two difference equations in the two variables p and ~.8
With respect to the wage share, equation (8) simply can be used. The deri-
vation of the expression for the employment rate requires some steps.
After rewriting (~) as
~ttl Ltf1~Lt
At - Nt~i~Nt




- a - b a Stfl
Rt o o t
(ltdk) dk
ao - (ltn)(ltm) and
b0 - (ltn)(lfm)
The reduced version of the model in (8) and ( 12) can also be written as
the following system:
ea
(13) ~t - a2pttl - ( al}1)
t
os
(14) ~t - (80-1) - bo~t
t
What are the properties of this system?
A steady-state growth path is reached when
(15) o~t - ost - 0
(13)-(15) together determine the equilibrium values for ~e and a
(16) ~e - b0
(HO-1)
e a29
This equilibrium point is locally stable. In geometrical terms this will
say that in a(p,a)-plane the point (pe,ae) is a center surrounded by a
closed curve (compare fig. 1). This curve summarizes the duration and
pattern of one Goodwin cycle. The position and the amplitude of cycle are
cieLermined by the 1n1Lia1 values I'or p and ~.
Rewriting (13) and (14) in terms of their equilibrium values yields:
(18) oat~~t - a2(~ttï-~e)
(19)
~~t,~t - bo(~e-~t)











The dynamics of the discrete variant of Goodwin's model and its geometri-
cal representation need a comment. Unlike Goodwin's model, in the discrete
version p and a are not determined simultaneously. As the system (13) and
(14) shows, their interdependency is split up in time. The income distri-
bution in t determines accumulation and employment in ttï, while the re-
sulting employment rate in ttl is the determining factor for the income
distribution in t}1.10
The growth cycle consists out of four phases. It can be described
as follows. At the border of region IV and I, the employment is below its
average value, so the rate of growth of the real wage is less than the
rise in the labour productivity. Therefore, profit share and profit rate
are rising, pushing up the accumulation rate above its average value. The
profit share and the growth rate of the accumulation arrive their maximum
values when the employment ratio reaches its average value. From this
moment on, phase II is actusl. Although the accumulation rate still ex-
ceeds the equilibrium rate of growth, this rate will decelerate because
the rising employment ration enables the labour force to bargain for real
wage increases in excess of the rise in labour productivity. Subsequently,
the profit share is reduced and is going to approach its average value.
This profit squeeze continues in phase III where the accumulation rate is
below average but the employment ratio, although decreasing, still exceeds
its equilibrium level. With the entering of phase IV, the profit share and
the profit rate recover. When initial conditions are restored, the des-
cribed dynamics restart.
Taking a long run view, this self-sustaining dynamic process with
its trade off between employment and distribution can be interpreted as a
formal description of a part of the recent history of the capitalist accu-
mulation. Using Goodwin's words, this explanation runs as follows: "...
[an] improved profitability carries the seed of its own destruction by
engendering a too vigorous expansion of output and employment, thus de-
stroying the reserve army of labour and strengthening labour's bargaining
power" (Goodwin 1967, p. 169).
Despite its flavour describing reality, the model suffers from too
much automatism. Apart from the manner capitalists take their accumulation
decisions, this concerns the rather mechanical wage regulation through a
real version of the Phillips-curve. This way of modelling wages presuppos-
ses that class power is ultimately the decisive factor on the labour mar-
ket. In modern capitalism however, wage formation is by and large arranged
by collective bargaining agreements. These agreements reflect compromise
rather than conflict. Unions are more than mere wage-claimers. Feeling
themselves responsible for durable employment of the labour population,
they keep an eye on current and future profit development and may moderate11
their wage claims when necessary. Capitalists, taking care for the profit-
ability of theír long term investments, strive for loyal workers and rest
and stability on the "wage front". Their objectives can be better off if
they consent with reasonable wage claims. This kind of attitudes contrast
with a strictly zero-sum interpretation of distribution issues as implied
by a model of class conflict. However, collective bargaining resulting in
distribution compromises need not to exclude the relevance of class power.
This relevance however has to be demonstrated, and not just be assumed.
The Goodwin model may benefit if the black-box character of the
wage formation can be superseded through an introduction of bargaining
elements. This extension may enlarge the realism of the model. And more-
over, an explication of the bargaining process can illustrate aims and
strategies of the parties and the conditions for consensus and conflict on
distribution issues either.
A logical way to handle this issue seems to be the replacement of
eq~ation (8) by a bargaining model. The next paragraph is adressed at the
derivation of such a bargaining model. As stated before, we will make use
of the Nash-solution.
IV BARGAINING RANGE AND THE NASH-SOLUTION
IVa THE NASH-SOLUTION OF THE BARGAINING PUZZLE
Nash ( 1950) puts the bargaining problem in utility terms and
treats it as a non-zero-sum fixed-threat game. With fixed threat ís meant
that both parties always have the possibility to choose a situation of
conflict rather than to procede with bargaining. The game i s a non-zero-
sum one because the utility of every agreement exceeds the (zero-)utility
of the conflict sitiiation. The parties order the several agreements in
terms of the utility increments with respect to the threat point. The
frontier of the relevant bargaining range can be reflected with an
Edgeworth-contractcurve, like the curve CC in fig. 2. This curve is the
locus of all the situations where one party can augment its utility only12
FIGURE 2
at the expense of the opponent. As long as the parties are moving into the
direction of the contract curve, their interests need not to be necessari-
ly contradictory. The partiea have collected and ordered all the relevant
information in an utility preference function.
Next, Nash formulates four axiomas which prescribe an unique solu-
tion for this game:
Pareto-optimality: the solution has to be an element of the utili-
ty frontier;
Symmetry: the parties have identical utility functions;
Transformation invariance: i f the abaolute utility values change
but not the preferred ordering, then the final outcome undergoes
no change;
Independence of irrelevant alternativea: if the preferred ordening
of the outcomes changes except with respect to the solution point,
then the game result will not change.
What Nash has proved is that this set of axiomas determines only
one solution of the game, namely point A on the contractcurve. At this
point, the product of the utility increments of both parties is maximal:
(Ui-U1)(U2-U2) - Max.
In this expression U1 and U2 stand for the players' conflict utilities,
while Ui end U2 denote utilities of the game solution.
(The game-theoretical literature provides numerous more comprehensive
treatments of the Nash-solution; compare Harsanyi (1956), Roth (1979)).i3
IVb A SOLUTION FOR THE BARGAINING INDETERMINACY IN A DYNAMIC SETTING
It is assumed that a bargaining income arises at the end of every
period. This income is divided among workers and capitalists within the
Nash-method. The bargaining income Rt results out the net added value Yt
after deduction of provisional wage costs wtLt and provisional profits,
rKt. With 'provisional' is meant that at the beginning of the period the
parties agree on a temporary wage rate w, and a temporary profit rate r.
These ex ante yields are paid during the production period. The provisio-
nal profit rate is assumed to be constant.
The resulting bargaining range can now be expressed as:
(1) Rt - Yt - wtLt - rKt
At the end of the production period, the parties have to achieve an agree-
ment on the distribution of this surplus income. The definite yields for
labour and capital result from the agreed division. The ex post wage rate
is denoted by c~, while n represents the ex post profit rate. A complete
division of the bargaining income is achieved when:
(2) Rt - (Wt-wt)Lt t (Rt-r)Kt
The parties come to an agreement by means of the Nash-method.
Workers use as utility function:
(3) Uw - a(w-w)a
and the capitalists:
(4) Uk - E (rr-r)b
Because K and L as well as w and r are known at the end of the production
period the actual stake of the bargain is income maximalisation. Analogous
to Nash, parties strive for a division which maximises the product of
their utilities.14
With (2)-(4) the following Lagrange function can be derived with the La-
grange-multiplicator u:
(5) V - or~(w-w)a (n-r)b - uLR-(w-w)L-(n-r)K]
A Pareto-optimal division arises when (5) is differentiated to w, n and u,
and the obtained results are equalized to zero:
~V
(6) ~ - aocE(w-w)a-1 ( n-r)b t HL - 0
~V
(7) ~n - bocE (w-w)a (rt-r)b-1 t 1~K - 0
(8)
~V
~~ - (w-w)L t ( n-r)K - R - 0
With (8) and after elimination of the u-term, (6) and (~) provide expres-





Apart from the division of the revenue-income in the current period, one
has to explain how parties agree on the provisional wage rate for the
coming period. The periodical increment of the ex ante wage rate is as-
sumed to follow quasi-automatically the difference between the ex post and
ex ante wage rates of the preceding period:
wt}1-wt - J(wt-wt)
Now, this solution for the bargaining process is integrated within a rela-
tive simple accumulation model. This model is a stripped version of Good-
win's: here, the relevance of the labour market and class power for wage
formation has been omitted. Before dealing with a Goodwin-plus-Nash model,
some dynamics of the stated formalisation of the Nash-solution should be
illustrated.15
(12) Yt - kKt
(13) Lt - Yt,Lt
(14) yttl,yt - 1 ` m
(15) Kttl - ( 1~dRt}Kt
Capital stock K and the constant capital productivity k determine the net-
product Y(12). Employment depends on labour productivity y and net-pro-
duct (13). Labour productivity rises with a constant rate m(14). Capita-
lists invest a constant fraction d of realized profits (15).
(1), (9)-(11) and (12)-(15) constitute together a complete model of eight
equations in eight unknowns: R, Y, w, K, L, Y, c~ and n. T'he model has a
stable steady-state solution. It can be reduced into one single equation
in the (ex ante) wage share.
Starting with inserting (9) into (11):
~ Rt
(16) wttl-wt - a;b'Lt:
L and R can be described as functions of k and y: L by means of (12) and
(13); R through (1), (12) and (13). Substituting the results in (16}
yields:
- a1 k(1-wt~Yt) - r
wttl-wt - atb' k~Yt




Note that this a is not the same as the one used in par. II. Here ~ has to
be interpreted as the wage share at the end of the production period but
before the distribution of the revenue.16




wt - 1 } atb ~t
An expression for the growth factor of the ex ante wage share is found
with (14) and (18):
(20)
~ttl wttl 1
~t - wt 'ltm




~t - ltm } ( l~m) (a'b)~t
The wage share reaches its equilibrium value if
~ttl~~t-1:
aj(1-r~k)
(22) ~e - ajtm(atb)
Putting (22) in ( 21) provides:
(23)
~t41 - ~atb)-aj ajfm(atb) ~e
~t - (ltm) ( afb)} (ltm) (a~b)~~t
This expression shows that
(24)
~t Z ~e ~ ~ttl ) ~t






Constancy of the wage share as the steady-state solution implies
long-run constancy of the other endogeneous variables. Steady-state growth
requires an increase of the ex ante wage rate in accordance with the con-
stant growth rate of labour productivity. Because of (11), the steady-
state growth path of the ex post wage rate can be written as:
(25) ~t - (1tm~J)wt
Thus, ex post wage rate always exceeds ex ante wage rate, both having same
rates of growth. Therefore, in the long run ex post wage share is constant
too and so ex post profit rate either. A fixed profit rate implies con-
stant growth factors for accumulation and production:




(~7~ L - l~m
t
Finally, the relative bargaining range R~Y also remains constant:
(28) Y - 1 - ae -r~k18
Note that equilibrium values of income shares are not influenced
by the accumulationquote d. Unlike Goodwin, any relationship between wage
formation and employment is absent. The resulting distribution is com-
pletely determined by the "fair" division of the Nash-method.
We illustrate the Nash-solution with some figures. Following Nash,
there has to be symmetry between the parties: a-b-1. Mutual confidence and
cooperative intentions are maximal: r-0, d-1 and j-1. Therefore, no
guarantee for a positive ex post profit rate exits, capitalists accumulate
realized profits completely and the new ex ante wage rate is identical
with the old ex post wage rate. Given the values of the technological
variables, the following expressions for the equilibrium values of the
wage share, profit share and relative bargaining range result:
(29) ae - 1~(lt2m)
(3~) rte - mk~(lt2m)
(31) (RIY)e - 2m~(lt2m)
Because revenue income is always divided in two identical parts as wage
and profit income, the symmetry of the solution is complete:
(32) (~-w)L - (n-r)K
Some aspects of this solution for the puzzle of the bargaining
indeterminacy can now be discussed. Clearly, choosing the approach of
Nash, any description of how parties come to an agreement on distribution
issues ís excluded. The model only points out that whenever the parties
intent to compromise as well as to cooperate they may overcome the inhe-
rent conflict character of distribution by accepting the specific class
preferences of the opponent. By granting the mutual income claims, parties
not only realize the preferred distribution outcome, moreover they elimi-
nate distribution conflicts as a main source of economic instability. As
such, the model highlights one of the conditions for a durable economic
equilibrium.19
To derive a determinate solution, one need not to rely on the
frequently used assumptions within game theory of perfect forsight and
rational expectations. The tendency to steady-state is virtually a perio-
dical sequence of local Nash solutions. This result entails the 'pretty'
possibility of returning to the reality of fluctuating growth again. A
starting point may be found in a relaxation of the constancy of the Nash-
dividends.
Such a relaxation can be achieved by an explícite integration of
information aspects. When perfect forsight is absent, the negotiating
parties suffer from a constrained ability to take full account of the
consequences of current agreements for the income shares in the following
periods. Therefore, it is rather plausible to assume that changing econo-
mic conditions will be reflected in changing class preferences and utility
functions. These recurrent adjustments in the Nash-dividends may prohibit
the carrying-on of the steady-state tendency.
This line of inquiry is not explored in the present paper. Vari-
able Nash-dividends can also be achieved by including elements of class
power. This is the subject of the next paragraph in which the Nash-solu-
tion is integrated within a Goodwin like accumulation model.
A GOODWIN-NASH MODEL
The proposed Goodwin-Nash model is a mixture of cooperatíon snd
class power elements. The model consists out of twelve equations. After
the foregoing, the first seven need no comment anymore:
(1)
Lt - Yt,yt
(2) Ytt1,Yt - 1'm
(3) Nt41INt - 14n
(4) k - Yt~Kt
(5) ~t - LtINt20
(6) ~t - wt~yt
(7) Kt;1~Kt - 1{dnt
The regulation of wage formation and distribution by a real Phillipscurve
in Goodwin's model is replaced by the Nash bargaining model. Here, only
the relevant equations of the Nash-solution are presented:





(10) nt-r - abb [k(1-~t)-r]
(11) wt}1-wt - ~t(~t-wt)
Goodwin's significance of scarcity and class power on the labour market
for wage formation and distribution is regained by assuming that the de-
termination of ex ante wage rate for the following period is based on the
actual ex post bargaining result as well as the actual employment ratio:
(12) ~t - h~t
When the employment rate is above average, capitalists have to accept a
relative high ex ante wage rate formation in order to prevent workers
falling back on a Goodwin like open class conflict strategy. In the op-
posite case, when the degree of employment is relatively low, workers
moderate their ex ante wage claims surpressing the capitalists' inclina-
tion towards the return to the hard world of Goodwin.
The model has twelve equations and twelve unknowns: Y, y, L, N, K, R,
w, w, n, ~, ~. It can be reduced to two difference equations in ~ and ~.




wttl-wt - atb. ~t .~t
With help of the following identity:
(14)
~ttl wttl 1
at - wt 'ltm
(13) can be rewritten as:
(15)
~tfl 1 1 ha
1-at-r~k
at - l.m } ltm'a~b' ~t '~t
This is the first one of the two difference equations.
The second is obtained as follows:









ltg - (ltn) (ltm)
Use of (10) gives finally the second equation in ~ and ~.
(19)
Sttl 1 t d{rtabb [k(1-at)-r]}
~t - ltg
The equilibrium solution of system (15) and ( 19) has as relevant proper-
ties, that investment and ex post profits expand with the natural growth22
rate g, while wage share and employment rate remain constant. The equili-
brium values of ~ and ~B can be found with p Ip - 1 respectively
~t;ll~t - 1. ttl t




Now, we can show that in the long run the Goodwin-Nash dynamics tends to a
stable steady-state solution with the above stated properties.
We start with the derivation of the two loci including all the (g,~)-com-
binations for which either
at;ll~t - 1 or
1~tt1lst ! 1.
The determination of the locus ~e I~ - 1 is relatively easy. We can make tfl t
use of the expression for a:
e
(22) ~t - ~e ~ gt;llAt - 1
Consíder equation (19). Size and direction of the períodical change in the
employment rate is determined by the ratio between the actual wage share
and its equilibrium value:
(~3) ~t ~ ~e ~ Sttl ~ St
In order to obtain the locus of ~ I~ - 1 we define a partial equili- t}1 t
brium function yr:
(24) ~t,.ll~t - v(Pt,at) - 1
After inserting ( 15), we obtain:
(25)
m atb ~t
~t - ah 1-at-rlk
Only 1-At-rlk ~ 0 is relevant:
(26) 0 C~( J~~ with ~~ - 1- rIk23
The relevant properties of (25) are the following:
.
~t(0) - ~ ~t(a ) - m
(27)
~~t~~~t ~ 0 ~2~t~~~2t ) 0
Furthermore, it is clear that
(28)
) )
~t ~ w ~ ~tt1 ~ ~t
Loci and directions of the periodical changes in ~ and ~ can be represen-







FIGURE 4As to the dynamic behaviour of the Goodwin-Nash model consider the
Jacobian of the system (15) and (19), linearized around its equilibrium,
í.e.
J - L
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Evaluation of the Jacobian yields that the equilibrium solution is a
stable node: i.e. wherever the system starts, there always results a
damped oscillatory and stable movement towards the equilibrium solution
(compare figure 5). A- 0, B~ 0, C~ 0 and D C 0 imply that the eigen-
values are a complex pair (oscillations) and have a negative real part
(stability).
This weak and diminishing cyclical movement towards an equilibrium steady-
state solution ultimately means that "Nash" is more dominant than
"Goodwin". The influence of the employment rate on the ex ante wage forma-
tion i s completely overruled by the fair division of the resulting revenue
income.
In order to clarify the dynamical process and the equilibrium solution, we
compare and comment upon tow cases. Case 1 reflects s situation where the
willingness of the parties to cooperate and to consent is great; both
parties have much confidence in the opponent's willingness to act in ac-
cordance with the agreed compromise. Wíthin case 2, parties confidence in







distrust, both parties force some a priori certainty by claiming a high
provisional wage rate and a high provisional profit rate during the pro-
duction period. Chosen figures are such that both cases have the same
equilibrium values. Start values are indicated with ps and ~s.26
Table 1
EX ANTE CLAIMS AND EX POST RESULTS
a-b-1 m-0,04 gg-0,8 ~3-0,8
k - 1~3 g - 0,05
CASE 1 CASE 2
BARGAINING PARAMETERS BARGAINING PARAMETERS
d- 1 h- 0,2074 d- 2~3 h- 0,4148
r' 0 r-0,05
EQUILIBRZUM VALUES EQUILIBRIUM VALUES





The figures show that the size of the bargaining parameters do not
have any influence at all on the basic pattern of the adjustment process
towards the equilibrium point. The adjustment process itself can be subdi-
vided into two parts.
Short run dynamics are dominated by a relatively fast movement of
wage and profit shares towards their equilibrium values. The Nash-compo-
nent of the compromise within the proposed Goodwin-Nash model is such a
strong equilibrating force that the potential significance of the employ-
ment component for distribution and wage formation is negligible in the
short run. Virtually, by acting within the confines of the compromise,
parties attach more value at reaching the agreed distribution at any level
of income, than at the resulting level of income and employment.
When distribution corresponds with the agreement, labour and pro-
duct markets will restore themselves from their preceding subordinated
role. From this moment on, the system will exhibit some Goodwin like dyna-
mics. However, unlike Goodwin's model, these dynamics are stabilizing of
nature. Key variable in this process is the employment rate. Because this
rate is still far away from its equilibrium value, the ex ante wage forma-27
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tion will diverge from the steady-state wage formation. This gap in the
wage formation stands in inversed proportion to the gap in the employment
rate. The recurrent wage gaps force a temporary walk away of the revenue
income and the distribution from their equilibrium values until the resul-
ting changes in the accumulation rate have lead to an adjustment of the
employment rate to its steady-state value.
It is now time to compare the two cases. Looking at the values of
I3 and a at the turning points, and at the moment when these points are
reached, clarifies that the more cooperative the parties are, the slower
the short run dynamics react and the larger the created disequilibrium on
the labour and product market is which the long run adjustment process has
to overcome. This paradoxical result can be explained as follows. The
periodical change in the ex ante wage rate is determined by the ex post
wage rate and employment rate of the preceding period:
Í29) wttl-wt - hst(~t-wt)
When I~rirl.lr~v ru~~~ mnrc. coopertittvta, h wll]. be smaller. 1'herE~fore, the short
run adjustment in the employment rate has to be greater in order to pro-
duce the necessary accomodations in the ex ante wage rate and ex ante
distribution that will lead to the establising of the fair distribution.
Depending on the size of the start values, a very disciplined attitude of
one or both of the two parties is required during the adjustment process.
In the presented cases, it concerns the workers. The realization of the
compromise in the long run requires that they consent with a temporary
reduction of the employment rate as well as the wage share. This can be
viewed as an illustration of the strategy dilemma in which the unions were
recently involved, and still are: whether to opt for a defence of current
wage income and consumption at the cost of future wages and employment
because of the continuation of the profit squeeze, or to strive for dur-
able ?mployment and consumption in the future by way of moderate current
wage cla.ims in the expectation that the capitalists will invest a suffi-
cient part of the resulting surplus profits to bring forth the desired
level and growth of employment and wages.30
In both cases, the final stage in the adjustment process is very
lengthy, because the revenue income end the relative bargaining range R~Y
remain in the neighbourhood of their equilibrium values:
(30) (R~Y)e - 1 - ~e - r~k
This altogether emphazises even more the dominance of Nash over Goodwin.
Now, we comment on the steady-state solution itself by extending
the model with some other game-theoretical elements.
Suppose the game is dynamic. At the beginning of period t-1, par-
ties have to decide on the value of the bargaining paremeters. Both par-
ties dispose over one degree of freedom. Capitalists fix the provisional
profit rate r and workers determine the size of h. Workers aim at a high
expost wage rate, while capitalists strive for a high ex post profit rate.
None of the parties is able to trace the long run effects of specific
values and combinations of h and r on the class-objectives. Mutusl confi-
dence determines how far the parties will cooperate.
When mutual confidence decreases, it seems rational for the par-
ties to claim more (ex ante) certainty about the (ex post) values of their
objective variables. At any rate of employment, workers will be more mili-
tant and opt for a high h, while rational capitalists will try to reduce
their uncertainty about ex post profitibality by claiming a higher ex ante
profit rate r. When mutual confidence increases, parties will make the
opposite choices.
A remarkable result of this game is that the choices of the par-
ties have no influence at all on the equilibrium values of their sims.
Moreover, when the employment rate and the wage and profit ahares are
considered too, one gets the striking outcome that short term rationality
will even lead to irrationality in the long run. This can be illustrated
by changing the values of h and r within case 2.TABLE 2









h 0,4 0,4148 0,42 h o,4148 0,4148 0,4148
r 0,05 0,05 0,05 r 0,06 0,05 0,04
a 0,7000 0,7000 0,7000 a 0,7300 0,7000 0,67 e e
~e o.9333 0,9000 0,8888 ge 1,5600 0,9000 0,6153
n 0.075 0.075 0.075 n 0,075 0.075 0,075 e e
je o,3733 0,3733 0.3733 je 0,6471 0,3733 0,2552
Given the capitalist option for a specific r, the workers can
influence neither level and growth path of the ex post wage rate (j ) nor
e
income distribution. The opted strategy however does affect the employment
rate: greater (less) militancy leads to a smaller (greater) employment
rate. The effects of the choice made by capitalists can be described in a
similar manner. The claimed ex ante profit rate does not influence the ex
post profit rate. Paradoxically, only workers benefit from a rise in r:
they are furnished with more certainty because the ex ante income distri-
bution as well as the ex ante wage rate are raised, and moreover the em-
ployment rate will rise too.
The effects of mutations in h and r for the values of p and ~
e e
can be read off from their already known expressions:
atb
~e - 1 - bk (g~d-r) - r~k
m atb ~e
~e - ah '1-~e-r~k32
As concerns the objective of the workers, the consequences of the
claimed ex ante yield can be clarified with the steady-state growth path
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Thus, workers have only influence on the employment rate. However,
"Nash" dominates "Goodwin". Therefore, the fair division of the revenue
income completely subordinates the potentiel aignificance of the employ-
ment rate for distribution and wage formation. All distribution issues are
controlled by capitalists. This concerna the size of the income shares as
well as the growth rates of the ex ante and the ex post wage rates. The ex
post profit rate however remains surprisingly unaffected by the choices
both parties make for specific values of the strategy variables, h and r.
Inserting the expression of Ae in equation (10), the Goodwin-Nash dividend
for the profit rate, yields:
(33) ne - g~d
The natural growth rate is given, so only the accumulationquote d deter-
mines the steady-state value of the expost profit rate. This final result
has a postkeynesian flavour. A self-austained steady-state exists only on
the conditions that the investments expand with the fixed natural growth
rate, and that the savinga provides the finance for these investments.
Only capitalists save. Thus, they determine with the size of their savings
ratio (our variable d) the steady-state proportion between profits and
investments, which guarantees the equality of savings and investments.
Therefore, they fix each steady-state period the levels of income and
employment as well as the functional income distribution.
Table 3 summarizes some effects of mutations of d for the equili-
brium values of the relevant variables.33
TAF3L1', 3
CHANGES IN d: EX POST EFFECTS
CONSTANT
a- b- 1 m -0,04 h- 0,4148
k- 1~3 g - 0,05 r- 0,05
d- 0,65 d - 0,6667 d- 0,68
Re - 0,8218 ~ee - 0,9000 pe - 0,9682
a - 0,6884 ~ - 0,7000 ~ - 0,7088 e e e
rte - 0,0769 R - 0,075 rr - 0,0735 e e
Therefore, it can finally be concluded that a durable class-com-
promise on distribution issues within the Goodwin-Nash model requires
first moderate ex ante wage and profit claims and second a high accumula-
tion quote.
VI SUMMARY
In this paper aspects of the relationship between collective wage
bargaining and business cycles have been discussed. We started with some
shortcomings of the usual representation of wage formation in macroecono-
mic literature on cycles and accumulation; usually, elements of the wage
bargaining process are ignored.
We have commented upon the well-known accumulation model of Good-
win on cyclical growth. Some arguments have been given why this model can
benefit from an explicit treatment of bargaining elements. In the paper an
alternative for Goodwin's assumption on a real Phillips-curve has been
Formulat.ed by restatíng Lhe game-theoretical Nash-solution for the puzzle
of bargaining indeterminacy. The integration of the Nash-solution within a
growth model enabled us to describe periodically the level as well as thedistribution of income in case of compromise and cooperation on bargaining
issues.
The proposed version of a Goodwin-plus-Nash-model yielded as the
main result that the cycle disappears altogether: any compromise on dis-
tribution issues and wage formation always leads to a tendency towards a
long run stable steady-state growth. This solution has been reached
without use of extreme assumptions auch as perfect forsight and rational
expectations. The movement to a durable eteady-atate is virtually a perio-
dical sequence of local Nash-solutions, requiring only the acceptance of
the resulting Nash-dividends by the parties periodically. A compromise
within the Goodwin-Nash model will be more in correspondence with specific
class preferences, when the a priori wage and profit claims are more mode-
rate and the accumulation quote of the capitalists is higher. Paradoxical-
ly, the more cooperative the parties are, the larger the forced disequili-
brium during the adjustment process is, and therefore the more likely it
is one or both of the parties will break up the compromise before steady-
state has been reached.
Although our version of the Goodwin-plus-Nash model highlights
steady-state is conditional upon a class-compromise on distribution issues
and wage growth, it has unfortunately eliminated the cycle out of Good-
win's model. T'he cycle may be regained by a revaluation of significance of
the employment rate within the exposed model. An extension with lags,
myopic expectations and imperfect information may lead to different con-
clusions. This has to be pointed out by further research.35
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